Implantable medical devices (IMDs), including pacemakers, implanted cardiac defibrillators and neurostimulator are medical devices implanted into patients' bodies via surgery and are capable of monitoring patient's conditions and delivering therapy. They often have built-in radio modules to support data reading and parameters reconfiguration according to the commands from external programmers. The lack of an secure authentication mechanism exposes patients to cyber attacks over the air and threatens patients' lives. Physically Obfuscated Keys (POKs) are a special means for storing the secret key inside the integrated circuit. In this paper, we design an effective authentication system for IMDs by utilizing POKs. The dynamic authentication and access control scheme is based on some secure pre-shared keys, which are protected by the POKs. We evaluate the proposed scheme with detailed security analysis and implement it on a prototype testbed to demonstrate its lightweight feature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Implantable medical devices (IMDs) such as pacemakers, cardiac defibrillators (ICDs), and neuro stimuli are electronic devices that can be either partially or fully implanted into patients' bodies. IMDs can be used to collect patients' physiological data and deliver treatment, and have been shown to be effective in coping with sudden death caused by cardiac arrest and ventricular arrhythmia [1] . Many IMDs are equipped with the wireless connections that enable them to be accessed by special external devices called programmers which are used by physicians to extract data and make reconfigurations. The wireless connection brings significant convenience for doctors to monitor patients' real-time condition while minimizing the influence on patients' normal lives. However, the benefits are also accompanied with the security issues as studied in ( [2]- [6] ). Barnaby Jack demonstrated a successful remote attack of an implanted insulin pump at the Hacker Halted Conference 2011 [7] where he controlled the insulin pump to give a lethal dose of insulin from 300-meters away. Former Vice President Dick Cheney had the wireless connection of his implanted defibrillator disabled in fear of terrorist attacks [8] .
In recent years, a number of solutions have been proposed by researchers to defend IMDs from unauthorized access. Unlike the normal wireless devices, designing authentication and access control schemes for IMDs would always face two seemingly contradictory critical requirements. On one hand, the scheme must be strong enough to defeat all access attempts from an unauthorized programmer. While on the other hand, a certain extent of permissiveness is also necessary for the emergent situation. When fatal medical events happen, the first-aiders may need to access the patient's IMD for data exporting and reconfigurations and any delay caused by a security scheme would increase the risk of the patient's life. To achieve the easy access on emergent condition, recent works on IMDs security turned to follow the touch-to-access assumption [9] - [12] . The assumption is valid because in the emergent situation when the patient is very sick, an attacker that is close enough to touch patient has already gotten the chance to easily kill the patient via other untraceable methods. So all these proposed schemes impose strong access control on normal use and the security mechanism can be easily disabled or bypassed by physical contact with the patient.
Our work adopts touch-to-access assumption to provide emergent access, but rather than the non-key approach the we base our design on the lightweight cryptographic operations. By integrating physically obfuscation keys (POKs) into authentication, we provide provable security. Additionally, by utilizing the POKs powered IC card as an authentication proxy, the IMDs' resource consumption on security is significantly decreased, and no special capability like ECG measurement is required.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We firstly provide some background information and formulation in section II and then present our design in section III, IV and V. Thereafter, the evaluation of our work is presented in section VI and the result of the experiment on our prototype device is given in VII. The review of related works and comparison with our design is presented in section VIII. Finally, we make conclusions in section IX.
II. BACKGROUND AND FORMULATION

A. Physical Obfuscation Keys
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) was proposed by Ravikanth in 2001 [13] as a hardware-based cryptographic primitive for authentication and secret key storage. PUFs rely on unique physical characteristic variations as the secret to exhibit a random Challenge-Response pattern that is, when a PUF is queried with a specific challenge, it outputs a random-like unpredictable response. This pattern is unique and impossible to be cloned. Most of the practical PUFs leverage the disorder of intrinsic features of integrated circuits (ICs), like gate propagation delay [14] and SRAM cell initial status [15] . All these disorders are determined by deviations in IC fabrication procedures that are impossible to be controlled intentionally.
Generally, PUFs are divided into two broad categories: strong PUFs and weak PUFs, differing in the number of available Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs). Typically, strong PUFs can easily achieve a large set of CRPs while weak PUFs only support a limited number of CRPs.
Physically Obfuscated Keys (POKs) [16] are a special application of weak PUFs that could be considered as a special form of secure key storage. The appearance of this technique brings a reliable solution on satisfying the requirement of securing the secret key from being compromised by invasive side-channel attacks. Recent POKs-based secure key generators have reached a bit error rate of less than 1% [17] and require no special process during fabrication, making it a cost efficient way to replace the expensive NVRAM component like EEPROM.
Bringer, et al. made the further step of proposing cryptographic algorithms [18] that defeat the key compromising from memory probing attacks. They achieved this by redesigning two basic operations used in linear-feedback shift register (LFSR): scalar product and exclusive OR (XOR) that only load part of the secure key into memory at each step and mask all the intermediate results with obfuscation matrix. Based on the specially designed LFSR, stream cipher and message authentication code algorithms are also provided in the paper. In summary, POKs based cryptographic system has the following advantages: 
B. Design Overview
Our authentication system involves four components: the IMD, the programmer, the Hospital Authentication Server (HAS), and IC cards for patients and doctors, respectively. The IC cards are contact cards with embedded POKs modules and are supposed to have the capability to perform some lightweight cryptographic operations like hash and message authentication code generation. The HAS is a centralized authentication server that is expected to be common in modern hospital and e-health system.
In our design, the IC cards are linked to patients' and doctors' identities through enrollment and function as the identity credentials. It satisfies the touch-to-access assumption by enforcing physical contact using an unclonable IC card. The HAS is used to provide fine-grained centralized access control policies and an easy way to pair the IMD with a new IC card after the old card is lost.
Compared with special devices like IMD guard [10] , the IC card is much cheaper and easier to be carried by patients and doctors. The IMD would remain secure, even when if patients forget to carry their IC cards.
C. Assumption and Threat Model
We assume that the adversary is powerful with abilities to launch many kinds of active and passive attacks, e.g.
1)
Eavesdropping and recording wireless communication between programmers and IMDs 2) Intercepting, modifying, and forging messages between programmers and IMDs 3) Communicating with IMDs remotely through highpower radio
Based on the touch-to-access assumption and the POKs special features, the adversaries are assumed to have the following restrictions: 1) Adversaries can't utilize the IC cards remotely since the card is a contact card with no wireless communicating function. 2) Adversaries can't retrieve secret credentials from the IC cards via usual usage or invasive probing because the credentials are stored in the form of POKs. Extracting or duplicating the credentials is impossible, as stated in section II-A. 3) Adversaries can't steal secret credentials from the HAS because the servers are powerful enough to deploy strong security schemes and are well managed by professional administrators.
III. KEY PAIR GENERATOR
In our design, IMD is the verifier and the IC cards and the HAS are the authenticators. For multi-party communication, key management ( [19]- [21] ) is always the essential component. Instead of an interactive approach among the three parties, we design a key generator to synchronously generate temporary key pairs based on long term master keys (Key 1 , Key 2 and Key 3 ) for the patient's IC card and the HAS, respectively.
We designed a key generator as shown in Fig. 1 , which can produce different temporary key pair for each access cycle. The generator is symmetric and can be divided into two individual parts. Each part requires an input master key and an Initial value for the stream generator. The keystream is generated by a Trivium [22] stream cipher. Trivium is a synchronous stream cipher designed for high performance on hardware deployment with extremely small resources requirements. Trivium is able to generate 2 64 bits of a key stream from an 80-bits secret key and an 80-bits initial value.
The Trivium module deployed in the IC card is the aforesaid POKs-based Trivium implementation which is hardwareintegrated into the circuit. Another part is software-deployed in the HAS with the digital secret key.
In most cases, the secret key stored in the POKs is determined at the time of fabrication, and cannot be reconfigured. Hence, we must find a way to extract the secret securely by legitimate users while permanently preventing further access. To satisfy this requirement, we add the One-time programming (OTP) [23] interface to enable access to the secret for one time only. After the first access, the interface is disabled physically like an electric fuze, and the secret is only accessible to the micro controller on the card. During the processing, the secret is securely accessed as described in [18] , which prevent the secret key leakage caused by memory scans. In each cycle, the key stream generator would output 256 bits of a key stream as a block. Then, the block is hashed by the SHA-256 module to produce a uniform 256-bit output as the temporary key pair.
The doctors' IC card has a simpler structure than the patients' card. The POKs in the doctor's card provide a master key Key 3 that is only used as the key for generating 256-bit message authentication code. The MAC algorithm is based on LFSR as described in [18] , which is inherently resistant against memory probe attack.
IV. THE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we present our protocol for IMD authentication and access control, which is based on the generated key pair SA i and SB i and doctor's master key Key 3 . The scheme is composed of four phases: Enrollment, Service Request, Authorization, and Session establishment. The following parties are involved: an Implantable Medical Device (IMD), a Hospital authentication Server (HAS), a Programmer (with the doctor's IC card plugged in), and the patient's IC card. Table I summarizes all the notations in our description. The Fig. 3 and 4 illustrate the enrollment phase and all the following phases respectively. 
A. Enrollment
During the enrollment phase, all parties in our protocol are initialized as shown in Fig. 3 . There are two separate processes: patient's registration and doctor's registration. 
1) Doctor's Registration:
As mentioned in section II, we assume that the programmer isn't bound with the doctor's identity. Hence, registration is required to setup accounts for doctors and pairing their identity with IC cards.
The doctor's account should at least contains detailed profile information and the master key Key 3 extracted from the doctor's IC card through OTP [23] . Aside from this, a corresponding identity number ID P and password are also setup for login on the programmer. Based on the profile information, HAS can check doctors' permission of accessing certain patient's IMD and carry out dynamic access control. For example, for a certain patient, all doctors that are in-charge have the permission to export monitoring data from his ICD, but only the chief physician can reconfigure it.
2) Patient's Registration: Similar to the doctors' registration, patients also need to setup accounts in HAS which consist of their profile information, initial value IV and the master key
Before the implantation, the doctor is responsible for extracting the master key Key 1 from a new IC card through OTP (as mentioned in section III) and then fusing the OTP to prevent further access. After that, two master keys and IV are loaded into the IMD and the cycle counter i is set to 1. Once the implantation is completed, the IC card is given back to the patient.
B. Service Request
During normal circumstances, the patient is conscious, and wireless connection to the Internet is available. The doctor firstly inserts his IC card into the programmer and then logs in with his account name and password. Once the login succeeds, a TLS session between the programmer and HAS is established to protect all the data transmitted between them, and the session is tagged by the doctor's identity number ID P . Thereafter, with patients permission, the doctor has the patients IC card inserted into the programmer.
As shown in step (i) shown of Fig. 4 , the service request is initiated by programmer sending the request code and the doctor's identity number to IMD. When the IMD wakes up from periodical hibernation and receives the request, it firstly retrieves the current cycle counter i and the corresponding key pair SA i and SB i . Then a response containing the patient's identity number ID I , counter i, current timestamp T 1 , and two HMACs over these variables are sent to programmer (step (ii)).
C. Authorization
When the programmer receives a response from the IMD in step (ii), it forwards the two HMACs to the IC card and HAS respectively, marked as step (iii) and (v). Specially, for message (v), the programmer makes use of the doctor's IC card to generate a UMAC for the entire message with the master key Key 3 as a proof of the doctor's identity.
For the patient's IC card, it retrieves the temporary key SA i according to the received cycle counter i. With SA i , it verifies the HMAC of T 1 received from the programmer. If the verification succeeds, the IC card sends back the HMAC of timestamp T 1 cascaded by request code R and increase its counter i by 1.
Similarly, the HAS retrieves the temporary key SB i with i and verifies the HMAC of timestamp plus doctor's and patient's identity number. If the HMAC is valid, the HAS would do following checks: 1) Check the temporal validity indicated by the timestamp T 1 2) Check the doctor's identity by verifying the UMAC with corresponding Key 3 3) Check the doctor's privilege level of accessing this IMD with identity ID I .
The authorization would stop if any one of these checks fails. If all the checks passes, the HAS sends back the HMAC containing a timestamp, two identity numbers and the request code R as described in step (vi) in Fig. 4 . Finally, HAS's cycle counter i is increased by 1.
D. Session Establishment
After the programmer receives the returned HMACs from the patient's IC card and the HAS, the access token is generated by doing XOR operation on the two HMACs as described in (1) . Then the programmer sends the hash of timestamp T 1 and the token back to IMD (step (vii)).
On receiving the response from the programmer, the IMD firstly records the current time T and checks whether the response is returned within the time window T S. If the response time is valid, the IMD generates the token token (as shown in (1)) by itself independently (the IMD possesses both two master keys to produce temporary keys SA i and SB i ). After that, the IMD compares the received Hash(T 1 ||T oken) with the generated Hash(T 1 ||T oken ). If the two results match, the programmer is authenticated and authorized to access the IMD, and the cycle counter in the IMD is increased by 1. Once the authentication and authorization is completed, a secret number SKey(i) is securely shared between the IMD and the programmer. The two parties calculate the XOR of two hashed HMACs independently as described in (2) . The secret can be used as the seed for deriving session keys to protect the communication between the programmer and the IMD.
V. ENHANCEMENT
A. Emergent Access
Apart from the normal access control described in section IV, special access mode is necessary for the emergent situation when patient is unconscious and require emergency care. In this situation, first aiders may need to access patient's IMD to perform first time measurement and treatment. Our normal access control scheme could become impediment for this emergent scene because the it requires the first aider to access the Hospital Authentication Server (HAS) remotely and request for temporary key SB i with valid doctor account. Apparently, it's too costly to maintain such a global accessible HAS system that has all the doctors registered on it, let alone Internet access may not be usable in some extreme cases.
To address this issue, we designed an offline access control scheme on the base of the normal procedure. In this scheme, the HAS possessed temporary key SB i is cached locally inside patient's IC card. First aiders would be able to acquire the cached temporary key easily as long as they can find the patient's IC card.
The update of cached keys is conducted after each normal access when patient's IC card is still plugged into doctor's programmer. Patient could authorize the doctor to download multiple cache keys from HAS and the size of cache is chose by the patient. Thus the cached keys could be updated to valid automatically.
B. Biometric Encryption of the Temporary Key Cache
The drawback of the cached keys is the possible leak of temporary keys. Since the cache keys are used as substitution of HAS, disclosure of them would undermine the effect of Fig. 4 . The Authentication Process HAS on security. For instance, if attackers steal the patient's IC card, they can initiate attack immediately since both two temporary keys can be obtained from the IC card. The patient has no way to protect himself even he realize the loss and report it to HAS manager. As a result, encryption must be used to protect the cached temporary keys. We denote each cache item as
where i is the counter as in section IV and the C k is the cache encryption key. The cache encryption key C k would be stored in the way described in [24] where the iris code [25] - [27] is exploited as obfuscation as described in [24] to prevent it been disclosed.
Here we give some brief retelling about the biometric encryption we use. Firstly, a binary string can be derived from an infrared image of patient's iris by demodulating the phase information with complex-valued 2D Gabor wavelets [25] . The generated the reference string, denoted as Θ ref , is acquired in patient enroll phase. After that, the HAS generate the cache encryption key C k and the key is encoded by Hadamard code and Reed-Solomon code successionally. The encoded C k is then mixed with the iris reference Θ ref and the result Θ lock is stored in patient's IC card.
During emergent situation, the first aider can use a digital camera (with infrared mode) to capture the patient's iris image and generate the sample binary string Θ sam to decrypt Θ lock by simple XOR and then acquire C k by doing Hadamard and Reed-Solomon decoding. After getting the cache encryption key C k , first aiders is capable of decrypting the temporary key SB i and access the patient's IMD locally without HAS's support. The robustness of cache key regeneration is guaranteed by Hadamard and Reed-Solomon code which deal with errors in binary level and block level respectively as discussed in [24] .
The whole emergent access scheme actually serves as replacement of step (v) and (vi) in normal access procedure. Instead of asking the HAS to provide the HMAC in step(vi), the HMAC is generated locally with decrypted SB i from Cache(i). In this way, there is no need to make any change on IMD.
C. Recovery Mode
To deal with the issue of patients losing their cards, we design a recovery procedure to reset the IMD and pair their IMDs with new IC cards. For the security concern of the recovery mode, the patient needs to go to the hospital for reporting the loss and sign the related documents in person before starting the reset procedure. After that, a programmer operated by the security administrator in the hospital would be granted with the reset permission by the HAS. The recovery mode is triggered by the programmer with a designated service request code. When receiving the reset request the IMD begins to challenge the programmer as shown in Fig. 6 . During the challenge process, the IMD asks the programmer to provide temporary key SB that corresponds to the cycle counter K. The challenge is conducted continuously for 2 * S times where S is the maximum number of cached temporary keys that an IC card can accommodate. The programmer is supposed to be able to provide correct response to all those challenges with the help of the HAS. The reset request would be rejected if any challenge is answered incorrectly. When the reset succeeds, the IMD enters the recovery mode to allow inputing new master keys Key 1 and Key 2 . Thus, doctor can re-do the patient's registration procedures to pair the IMD with a new IC card and the old stolen IC card is invalidated permanently. 
VI. EVALUATION
A. Performance Evaluation 1) Usability: Our proposed scheme may be integrated into different types of existing e-health systems. By introducing the HAS, the access control is achieved centrally and dynamically by the remote server rather than local devices like IMDs. The 3-tier structure brings two benefits. The first is to eliminate the need for the IMD to store a large amount of information about doctors' identities and privileges in its valuable storage space. The second is the convenience for managing the access control policy. For example, when a doctor resigns from a hospital, the HAS can easily revoke his permission to access any IMD by deleting this doctor's profile. While an interim access could be easily granted by adding a one-time permission to the certain doctor's account. Also, all the accesses are traceable and auditable by the interaction with HAS.
2) Overhead: Typically, IMDs are resource-constraint devices that are expected to operate by battery for up to 7 years. That means security schemes for IMDs must be extremely lightweight to reduce power consumption. In the following, we analyze the overhead of our scheme by listing all of the computation and communication overhead:
The computational overhead: 1) key-pair generation: 1)Two Tirvium bit stream generators with a 256-bit output for each cycle. 2)Two SHA-256 operations with 256-bit output. In all, we have 720 bits of receiving and 608 bits of sending within each access cycle. There is no other computational intensive operation during the access except those listed above.
B. Security Analysis
According to our threat model, attacks on IMDs can be classified into five types: 1) Passive Attacks: Try to recover valid security credentials from eavesdropped communication. 2) Active Attacks: Intercept the communication between the IMD and the programmer, then manipulate the packet to deceive the devices. 3) Desynchronization Attack: Desynchronize the cycle counters among the IMD, the IC card, and the HAS to achieve the Denial of Service (DoS) attack. 4) Identity Impersonation Attack: Try to impersonate the legitimate doctor to access the patient's IMD. 5) Fake Emergence Attack: Try to bypass the authentication and the access control procedure by triggering fake emergent access.
Below we show the security of our scheme by discussing each type of the attacks.
1) Passive Attacks: Adversaries can eavesdrop wireless communication between the programmer and the HAS or between the IMD and the programmer. Since the session between the programmer and the HAS is protected by the TLS, adversaries are not able to extract any information about the intermediate packets. Additionally, eavesdropping communication with the IC card is impossible because the IC card is a contact card that is only accessible by the programmer. Specifically, adversaries have the ability to obtain T 1 , R, i, ID P , ID I , and T oken from the unencrypted communication before the session is established.
None of above parameters reveals any information about
the key pairs SA i and SB i , nor brings adversaries any advantage to generate valid access token except packet T oken. However, the token is valid only for one time access within the time window T S and the next token is generated without any information from the previous token. Hence, capturing outdated tokens can't help the adversaries to produce the next valid token. Even if the attacker succeeds to get a valid token within the time window, it still can't generate the session key seed Skey(i) to communicate with the IMD.
Modeling attack on cryptographic primitives are not practical as well. New key pairs and tokens are only generated when accessed by a legal doctor, and the output values are obfuscated by the SHA-256 algorithm. It's very difficult for attackers to recover SA i and SB i from output of HMAC operations [28] .
2) Active Attacks: In active attacks, adversaries intercept the transmission between the IMD and the programmer and then manipulate the data to deceive the IMD or the programmer. However, the identities of the IMD, the programmer, and the HAS are secured by POKs-based master keys or kept in the server. Even if adversaries can successfully intercept those transmissions, they have no way to generate valid HMACs for manipulated data. The reply attack is not feasible due to the implementation of the timewindow. The IMD and the programmer would reject all duplicate packets that are outside of the timewindow.
Another type of active attack is extracting credentials by invasive ways on IC cards. There have been a lot of methods to recover security credentials by tampering IC card circuits [29] - [31] . However, with the master key implemented in the form of POKs, any attempt to tamper the circuit would fail and destroy the secret in the card totally.
3) Desynchronization Attack:
A lot of PUFs-based authentication protocols that rely on synchronization are subject to the desynchronization attack. Normally, the desynchronization attack is achieved by intentional interruptions during normal authentication, which results in the temporary key generator in different components running at malposed cycles. In our work, the desynchronization attack could be avoided by applying one-step cache in the IC card and the HAS for the previous used temporary keys SA i−1 and SB i−1 . Since the IMD increases its cycle counter i when authorized by the IC card and the HAS succeeds, the desynchronization condition only happens when the IMD's counter is one step slower than the IC card or the HAS. When the IC card and the HAS receive the counter from the programmer at step (iii) and (v) in Fig.  4 , they can easily determine whether to use the cached keys or newly generated keys. In this way, the system is synchronized again.
4) Identity Impersonation Attack:
The scenario exists when attackers disguise themselves as the doctor and use a valid programmer to access the patients' IMDs. This kind of identity fraud is prevented in our scheme by the doctor's identity proof at step (v) in Fig. 4 . To impersonate the legitimate doctor, attackers must get a valid doctor's IC card that was registered on the HAS. Even if the attacker may be able to steal a valid IC card from doctors, the stolen identities are not universally applicable to all IMDs, which won't bring severe security risk for the whole system. Also, this kind of attack can't ignore the touch-to-access assumption because accessing IMD always needs the patient's IC card and it's difficult to use the IC card without the patient's permission. Through physical contact with the patient, attackers are highly likely to be spotted and recorded by other people or video monitoring systems.
5) Security of Emergent Access:
Many previous works introduce additional risk by adding emergent access mode. For example, cloaker in [11] and IMD Guard [10] rely on external devices to secure the IMD, and when the external devices are removed IMD is open to access. This cause potential risk when the external device is stolen or the patient forgets to take it. Instead of trying to let the IMD be aware of the emergent situation, the access control procedure is all the same from IMD's perspective, which means the aforementioned touch-to-access assumption still holds in emergent access since the temporary key SA i can only be acquired from patient's IC card. To exploit the emergent access, attackers must get the patient's IC card and iris image. Even the IC card is obtained by attackers without breaching the touch-to-access assumption (e.g. lost by the patient), the iris image must be captured in front of the the patient that can be easily detected. Additionally, the cached keys in IC card can be easily invalidated after the patient lost his card: just run the normal access for multiple rounds to override the cached SBs. After that, attackers will not be able to access the patient's IMD even they get the patient's Iris code. The security of iris code has been extensively discussed and many counterfeit iris detection schemes are proposed in [32] - [34] . However, most of the counterfeit iris attack (e.g. cosmetic lense with texture, printed iris on paper) has the prerequisite of acquiring high resolution of victim's Iris NIR image. The NIR that are used to illuminate iris only has the effective range of 50 70 cm [35] . The successful iris code generation requires resolution of at least 50 pixels in iris radius for the iris picture [27] . As a result, it's hard for attackers to get the usable iris image without breach the touch-to-access assumption.
6) security of Trivium:
Unlike block cipher such as AES, there isn't a widely recognized secure stream cipher. Trivium has been selected as part of the eSTREAM project [36] . Up to now, there is no effective analysis attack that is better that brute force search. Existing attacks utilizing the side channel like Differential Power attack [37] and Fault Injection attack [38] all require hardware tampering of the cipher IC. This kind of hardware attack is prevented in our design because of the use of tampering-resistant POKs to protect the master key Key 1 in the patient's IC card. Once the circuit is modified, the master key will be destroyed permanently. Moreover, passive analysis is also not applicable to our design. The output of the Trivium stream generator, the temporary key SA i ,and SB i are never transmitted directly over the air. Instead, they are only used as keys for Hash MAC. That makes it impossible for attackers to acquire long continuous output stream for analysis which is required in some software based attack against Trivium [39] , [40] VII. EXPERIMENT
A. Testbed Specification
Because the IMD source code is not available, we could not run experiments on IMDs. Instead, we ran real experiments on emulated devices that are similar to IMDs. To evaluate the overhead of our scheme, we build a testbed as shown in Fig. 7 . Our testbed includes two TelosB sensor and a Raspberry Pi. The TelosB sensor mote connecting with the Raspberry Pi emulates the programmer, and the Raspberry Pi functions as interface between the programmer and the human operator. The other TelosB sensor emulates an IMD. We chose TelosB with RIOTos as an simulation of IMD. As stated in [10] , the Telosb sensor node has a similar resource constraint low-energy feature as commercial IMDs. TelosB is powered by a TI MSP430 microprocessor, which is a highly energyefficient processor with even weaker computational capability compared to many IMDs'. The RAM size in TelosB is only 10 KB and is smaller than typical IMDs which is supposed to be more than 2MB after 2002 [41] . This means that any protocol that can be accommodated to TelosB must be lightweight enough for most IMDs.
The performance evaluation consists of two parts. Firstly, we evaluate the energy consumption overhead and then the transmission overhead. Fig. 7 . The Prototype Testbed
B. Experiment Results
We split the design into several parts, one for the key generator and the other for the HMAC and SHA256 operations. By deploying asynchronous counters we can record the start and end time for each operation with the accuracy of 1 millisecond. In this way, we obtain the time consumption of those operations and then transform it to the energy consumption with the help of energy consumption models [42] - [44] for TelosB as shown in Table II . The total computing time for a complete authentication cycle is 367ms, if the transmission time is not taken into account. The overhead for different parts is listed in Table  III . Unlike the computational part, the overhead for transmission is much more complex because of the utilization of low power listening and collision avoiding mechanism in the MAC layer. The listening time is uncertain depending on environment noise, and the power consumption on synchronizations is difficult to specify. Therefore, to make things easier, we test the overhead of broadcasting packets with no retransmission. The results of the transmission test are listed in Table IV . With the test results above, we can calculate the total time and energy overhead by adding different parts together as given in (3) and (4) .
The results show that the energy consumption and time overhead are acceptable.
VIII. RELATED WORK AND COMPARISON
A. Pre-loaded Keys
In the first category of related works, a long-term and device-specific credential is pre-loaded into the IMDs and the external programmers must possess the correct credential for access. Halperin et al. [45] proposed that all legitimate programmers should carry a master key from which the IMDspecific key can be generated, given a certain device ID and a nonce sent by the IMD. Li et al. [46] devised a rolling code based authentication scheme, in which the IMD and the programmer share a pair of encryption keys that are used to encrypt a sequence number. The access is granted only if the difference between the sequence numbers are within a certain range. Liu et al. [47] added an extra wake-up circuit before the main circuit of the IMD. The wake-up circuit takes advantage of the passive RFID technology, so that it is able to harvest energy from the incoming signal to verify the wake-up authentication code. The main circuit will be woken up only if the wake-up code is verified.
Other researchers proposed that the IMD programmer can obtain the credential right when it attempts to access an IMD. In [35] , the access credential can be extracted from the patient's biometric features such as the fingerprints, iris and height. Denning et al. [48] used visual objects to carry the credential. Specifically, the operator of the IMD programmer first needs to know which object the credential is engraved on (e.g., a medical alert bracelet). The credential can be formatted as a visible 2D barcode or as an ultra-violet visible 2D barcode.
The main drawback of the aforementioned schemes is the master key leakage. Storing the master key in the programmer is not considered as secure in face of different hardware tampering attacks. For the static credentials derived from biometric features or printed on personal belongings like bracelets, they can be easily duplicated during daily life. In comparison, our design relies on POKs to protect the master keys. The secrets are never revealed.
B. Temporary Keys
Instead of using pre-loaded credentials for access control, some works tried to establish temporary keys by extracting time-varying information from patient's physiological signals. Most of them are also based on the touch-to-access assumption as our work does because the physiological features where the key is derived can only be measured when the programmer is physically close enough to the patient. Physiological values like the electrocardiogram (ECG or EKG) have a high level of randomness and the measurement is considered accurate only if the device is in physical contact with the patient. Hence, ECG signals is used to produce the temporary keys in many existing works [9] , [49] .
Another way to establish temporary keys is to have the IMD generate a temporary key, then send it to the programmer. The communication range is limited so that the programmer can correctly receive the key only if it is close to patient. Body-coupled communications [46] , [50] , audio channel key exchange [45] all belongs to this category. After the key generation/distribution is completed, the temporary keys can be used to establish an encrypted communication channel between the IMD and the programmer.
Though schemes utilizing physiology values to generate temporary keys are popular in recent years, they all face with problems of reliability and usability. Accurate measurement of certain physiological value is not a easy task because of the noise and distortion. To guarantee the successful pairing rate, those schemes always require comparatively long periods of measurement that can be up to a few tens of seconds (multiple ECG pulses). And because those schemes rely on restricting the communication distance, the assumption won't always establish since adversaries can use powerful equipment like high-gain receivers or sensitive sensors. These schemes are not based on provable theories, and their security may always be vulnerable to newly-developed attacking techniques.
Aside from the limitation above, all these temporary key designs requires the IMDs to be equipped with special purpose functionalities, for example, ECG measurement, accelerometer, or special communication module. These functionalities may be redundant for certain types of IMDs, which would increase the cost and energy consumption.
In comparison, our work is based on secure cryptographic operation that can be accomplished fast. All the operations on the IMD could be accomplished in software approach, and no special functionality or sensor is required.
C. Proxy
A group of existing schemes use a proxy device to perform the authentication on behalf of the IMD, to reduce its computation overhead and power consumption. The common design of proxy-based security schemes [10] , [12] , [51] , [52] includes (1) the proxy device jams the signal of external programmers until they are authenticated; (2) the IMD allows open-access when the proxy is not in proximity.
The Shield [51] , [53] is an exception since it not only jams the programmer's signal, but also the IMD's signal. Equipped with a full-duplex radio with two antennas, Shield is able to receive and decode the IMD's signal, meanwhile jamming it so that the programmer cannot receive and decode the complete IMD's message. A secured communication channel is assumed to have been set up between the Shield and the legitimate programmer. Therefore, Shield actually serves as a relay between the IMD and the programmer. Similarly, Cloaker [52] is also a mediator that forwards all authorized communications between the IMD and programmer. These schemes allow the proxy to log all the communications for forensic and analytical purposes.
In the other schemes [10] , [12] , the proxy devices are mainly considered as an external authenticator (not a relay), which stores the public keys of all authorized programmers and are able to verify the identity of the programmer that requests for access using its digital signature. The communication channel between the IMD and the programmer is established, after the programmer is successfully authenticated. In [10] , a pair of lightweight symmetric keys are issued to the IMD and the programmer, to encrypt their future communications. In [12] , the authentication proxy is embedded into a gateway. The environment is considered safe (no eavesdroppers) in [12] , hence no encryption is added.
The adversary can launch spoofing attacks to deceive the IMDs into thinking that the proxy is absent by jamming the proxy's signals. Upon detecting such jamming attacks, the Cloaker [52] would perform its own attack to ''jam the jammer", so that the unauthorized programmer cannot communicate with the IMD either; IMDGuard [10] can announce its presence to the IMD by jamming the IMD's transmission of the challenge message. Specifically, the IMD sends the challenge message in two parts. When the proxy hears the first portion, it realizes that the communication link to the IMD is highly likely to be jammed, therefore it will jam the second portion of challenge message from the IMD. This type of mechanism usually supports emergent access by removing the external devices from the patient, and then the IMD would accept all requests from the unauthenticated programmer. Therefore, patients need to take the external proxy all the time to protect themselves from remote attack. Additionally, the jamming can interfere with other devices and violate laws regarding radio interface. Our design doesn't rely on the jamming radio to insulate the IMD; as a result, won't have this kind of problem. Moreover, the dynamic access control based on doctor's identity can not be accomplished in these schemes because they are simple access control schemes with no authentication procedure included.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed utilizing the Physically Obfuscated Keys (POKs) for the implantable medical deviceauthentication system. POKs can protect secret keys pre-loaded into IMDs which are used for authentication. The design satisfies both the requirements for security and emergent access.
